There are several conclusions that we can draw from this analysis of the data:
1. It is easier to predict when
other countries are going to fail than when they will succeed. Thus, states
fail to be successful for all the same reasons, but predicting coercive success
globally for nations other than the United States seems to involve other
variables not captured by this data set.
a. The greater the distance between
the host and the coerced nation the more likely the coercive attempt will fail.
b. The greater the total population
of the coerced nation compared with the host nation the more likely the
coercive attempt will fail.
c. As the coerced nations PDI goes
up, the more likely the coercive attempt will fail.
2. In the model created for the
United States, Hofstede’s Dimensions are highly sensitive.
a. As the coerced country’s
individualism (Coidv) increases
likelihood of failure decreases (more collectivist countries are less likely to
be coerced)
b. As the coerced country’s
quantity-of-life (Comas) increases
likelihood of failure decreases (more
quality-of-life oriented countries are less likely to be coerced)
c. As the coerced country’s
indulgence (Coivr) increases
likelihood of failure increases (more
indulgent countries are less likely to be coerced)
3. Whether the United States has
nuclear weapons (USnuke) plays an
ambiguous role in coercive diplomacy, sometimes drastically decreasing and
sometimes drastically increasing the probability of failure.
4. Military spending, troop size and
readiness for war do not play as large a role in the ability of a country to
coerce another as many scholars previously supposed. While military expenditure
is a significant variable, the coefficient has a negative effect on the
outcome, ie. increased spending increases the chance of failed coercive
diplomacy.