In the 1780s and 1790s a fledgling confederation of colonies rebelled against the British empire in an attempt to gain independence. Outgunned, outmanned and with significantly poorer technology on their side, these rebels used guerilla tactics to beat down the British Empire in spite of an impressive showing by Her Majesty’s Army and Naval power. 200 years later in Vietnam, the United States found itself on the other end of guerrilla warfare—losing a war that should have been a slam-dunk in the mind of those calling the shots. The scenario begs the question: why can’t the most powerful country in the world coerce a country of farmers? I hypothesize that a country’s ability to coerce is affected by a finite set of pre-measurable variables—that a country can know before attempting to coerce if they are likely to be successful.
This hypothesis tests quantitatively the qualitative assessment made by many researchers that increased military spending, military size or decreased proximity will directly increase the likelihood of successful coercive diplomacy attempts[30]. It further attempts to strengthen their justification of failed attempts at coercive diplomacy in the face of overwhelming military might (which they couch in the form of subjective case-by-case explanations of ‘extenuating circumstances’ or ‘factors beyond a country’s control’) by quantitatively assessing actual measurable variables that tend toward failure. This design, by its quantitative analysis, removes the need for subjective analysis and presents data from the lifespan of a hegemon. Indeed if the only significant variable is time[31] it will be revealing in our understanding of how and when coercive diplomacy works.
While there are significant qualitative studies on coercive diplomacy, very little has been done to aggregate relevant data—especially data prior to 1940—to determine what specific, measurable elements matter quantitatively. I will review the existing literature and expand on the limited data analysis and theoretical backing that the qualitative work provides.
The question itself draws upon the theoretical framework set up by Coral Bell’s idea of “prudent statesmanship,”[32] ie. “a careful calculation of the adversary's power and the costs and risks relative to the interests at stake.”[33] Weighing relative power and determining what levels of power are seen as threatening are critical in assessing the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy. Bell, et al. presents this idea in an analogy of boxers sizing each other up in a ring. Relative differences in size and weight as well as known aspects of each contestant’s history factor into each boxers’ assessment of the potential outcome of the round and the price of participation.
This research turns the “calculation” suggested by Bell, which in his paper is a subjective calculation, into a numbers-based analytical calculation with prescriptive power and statistical significance. Given the correct inputs, the success or failure of an attempted diplomatic coercion should be predictable.
The scope of my research, in order to be meaningful, must include a hegemon[34] and must have available data for a period of more than 50 years[35] in order to mitigate the effects of specific wars and also include periods of relative global peace. In order to meet these criterion I have selected the United States using data from the years 1800-2000. The United States is the most commonly selected country for testing the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy. This is because of the availability of data that comes as a result of the transparency of a democratic government and because of its hegemonic status both regionally in its early history and globally in its more recent history.
[31] See Ewing, Joseph. “Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa” Working Paper (2007)
[32] Coral Bell. The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management. London: Oxford Univ. Press (1971)
[33] Russell Leng. “Will they ever learn? Coercive bargaining in recurrent crises.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Sep., 1983), p. 380, Sage Publications, Inc.
[34] A regional power is, theoretically according to Bell, the only actor that should have the ability to engage in coercive diplomacy with another state.
[35] This period of time was selected because it is longer than any post-Westphalian conflict.
This hypothesis tests quantitatively the qualitative assessment made by many researchers that increased military spending, military size or decreased proximity will directly increase the likelihood of successful coercive diplomacy attempts[30]. It further attempts to strengthen their justification of failed attempts at coercive diplomacy in the face of overwhelming military might (which they couch in the form of subjective case-by-case explanations of ‘extenuating circumstances’ or ‘factors beyond a country’s control’) by quantitatively assessing actual measurable variables that tend toward failure. This design, by its quantitative analysis, removes the need for subjective analysis and presents data from the lifespan of a hegemon. Indeed if the only significant variable is time[31] it will be revealing in our understanding of how and when coercive diplomacy works.
While there are significant qualitative studies on coercive diplomacy, very little has been done to aggregate relevant data—especially data prior to 1940—to determine what specific, measurable elements matter quantitatively. I will review the existing literature and expand on the limited data analysis and theoretical backing that the qualitative work provides.
The question itself draws upon the theoretical framework set up by Coral Bell’s idea of “prudent statesmanship,”[32] ie. “a careful calculation of the adversary's power and the costs and risks relative to the interests at stake.”[33] Weighing relative power and determining what levels of power are seen as threatening are critical in assessing the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy. Bell, et al. presents this idea in an analogy of boxers sizing each other up in a ring. Relative differences in size and weight as well as known aspects of each contestant’s history factor into each boxers’ assessment of the potential outcome of the round and the price of participation.
This research turns the “calculation” suggested by Bell, which in his paper is a subjective calculation, into a numbers-based analytical calculation with prescriptive power and statistical significance. Given the correct inputs, the success or failure of an attempted diplomatic coercion should be predictable.
The scope of my research, in order to be meaningful, must include a hegemon[34] and must have available data for a period of more than 50 years[35] in order to mitigate the effects of specific wars and also include periods of relative global peace. In order to meet these criterion I have selected the United States using data from the years 1800-2000. The United States is the most commonly selected country for testing the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy. This is because of the availability of data that comes as a result of the transparency of a democratic government and because of its hegemonic status both regionally in its early history and globally in its more recent history.
[31] See Ewing, Joseph. “Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa” Working Paper (2007)
[32] Coral Bell. The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management. London: Oxford Univ. Press (1971)
[33] Russell Leng. “Will they ever learn? Coercive bargaining in recurrent crises.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Sep., 1983), p. 380, Sage Publications, Inc.
[34] A regional power is, theoretically according to Bell, the only actor that should have the ability to engage in coercive diplomacy with another state.
[35] This period of time was selected because it is longer than any post-Westphalian conflict.