Coercive Diplomacy – Success or Failure (Success)
The dependent variable—the success or failure of coercive diplomacy—is widely debated on two points. First, how one defines success or failure and second, the nature of coercive diplomacy itself.Defining the success or failure of an attempt at coercive diplomacy is significantly more than just defining an instance of coercive diplomacy. Most scholars agree[1] that an instance of coercive diplomacy is defined as being successful if one or more explicitly stated objectives sought by the aggressor state against the coerced state are met. Some scholars define these cases as “partial successes” (where at least 1 objective is met up to 50% of objectives met) “successes” (50% or greater objectives met) and “failures” (no objectives met). For the purposes of my paper any success (partial or full) that is not followed by escalated conflict by the aggressor state within a 1 year window is defined as a success otherwise it is considered a failure. This variable is coded dichotomously using “0” for instances of failure and “1” for instances of success.
The existing literature differs widely in its use of the term “coercive diplomacy”. The first school of thought is that coercive diplomacy is an aggressor state’s use of force to carry out previously stated threats against another state in order to accomplish specific goals in an area outside the aggressor state’s sovereign sphere[2]. The second school of thought stipulates that the aggressor state issues threats to achieve stated goals with the assumption that they will carry out their threat if the goals are not met, but that force is not used (use of force constitutes a military action, which is not considered traditional diplomacy)[3]. My research follows that of the second camp, defining coercive diplomacy as threat or limited use—rather than full-on use (ie. war)—of force.
Even within this definition of coercive diplomacy, there are numerous operationalized definitions, many of which reflect the lack of substantive quantitative work that has been done in this area. Mandell, in the qualitative camp, defines coercive diplomacy using his own non-unique term “gunboat diplomacy.” He defines it as “the demonstration, threat, or use of limited naval force for political objectives.”[4] Because he has selected his timeframe as late Cold War, his research draws entirely on showdowns between the United States and the U.S.S.R.
In a 1984 speech, Secretary of State George Shultz defined coercive diplomacy: “crisis management or power projection or a show of force or peace-keeping or a localized military action…short of an all-out national commitment…”[5] This incredibly broad definition takes on so many variations that it is difficult to determine if the state engaging in “crisis management or power projection” needs to have a specific objective in mind, or if any military action short of an all-out war is considered coercive diplomacy.
Blechman and Kaplan give the most rigorous operationalization of coercive diplomacy in five parts. The following lays out their criteria for a case of coercive diplomacy:
“A political use of the armed forces occurs when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence or be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence. Thus, a political use of the armed forces [is] inferred to have taken place if… (1) A physical change in the disposition (location, activity, and/or readiness) of at least a part of the armed forces had to occur. [Verbal threats were not considered]… (2) Behind this activity there had to have been a certain consciousness of purpose… (3) Decisionmakers must have sought to attain their objectives by gaining influence in the target states, not by physically imposing the U.S. will…(4) Decisionmakers must have sought to avoid a significant contest of violence…(5) Some specific behavior had to have been desired of the target actors.”[6]Within this operationalization of the dependent variable, Blechman and Kaplan capture all the elements used by other scholars. However, their detailed analysis of a shorter period of time—post World War II to the present—goes beyond the proposed scope for the extended time period from 1800-2000 considered in this paper.
In this study coercive diplomacy is defined as the political use of armed forces by a host country acting unilaterally in the form of
- No militarized action[7] (ie. statements of threat, etc.);
- Threat to use force;
- Display of force; or
- Use of force without resorting to violence in excess of 100 deaths[8] in order to influence state-level actors to
- Surrender[9];
- Yield;
- Release Hostages; or
- Compromise.
- Deaths exceeded 100;
- The host country withdraws without resolution or unclear resolution;
- The host country yields; or
- There is a stalemate.
This operationalization provided by the Correlates of War 2 Project also relies upon public records rather than personal interpretation. This definition does not suffer from the same case-selection bias that plagues many researchers. Indeed, the timeframe which necessarily limits the definition also provides a broader scope with potentially greater predictive power because of changing poles in world power. The research spans a unipolar world under the United Kingdom, a bi-polar world under the United States and the U.S.S.R., a unipolar world under the United States, and arguably the beginnings of a multi-polar world under China, the E.U, et al. and the United States[10].
This analysis draws and expands further on existing literature by analyzing specific data that is believed to affect the outcome of coercive diplomacy, ie. the independent variable set. The variables that are included from the existing literature are limited by the availability of data prior to the instance of coercive diplomacy. Without this pre-existence they lack predictive power. This removes the oft-repeated justification of policymakers that “hindsight is 20/20” by providing data that truly is predictive.
GDP (Gross Domestic Product) (USGDP, CoGDP, CompGDP)
One of the most heavily relied upon indicators by all scholars is relative GDP[11]. This is simply operationalized by drawing recorded GDP data based on System of National Accounts 1993 (SNA93), the internationally accepted method for determining national GDP. The data will be represented on its own (USGDP, CoGDP) and as a ratio of the two numbers with U.S. GDP in the denominator and the coerced country in the numerator (CompGDP). The underlying theory is that a significant enough difference in aggregated productive power would be enough to deter or coerce action from the lesser of the two parties involved[12].Military Expenditure (USmilex, Comilex, Compmilex)
A subset of this data group is the percentage of GDP devoted to military spending[13]. While the United Stated has barely three times the GDP of Japan, it has more than five times the military spending. Considering that coercion does not take into account only sheer size but “muscle mass”—to extend Bell’s analogy—this data has the potential to have great predictive power in determining the outcome of an attempt at coercion.Military Personnel (USmilper, Comilper, Compmilper)
Other authors, Mandel and Kahn included, have struggled with the ability to quantify “military might.” The difficulty arose with the advent of super-weapons like the nuclear bomb, which changed comparative military advantage forever[14]. As a result, this paper will not seek to quantify total military might but simply the physical size of military, ie. the human element. This simplification is done for two reasons: (1) the difficulty of accurate and undisputed data (discussed earlier) in quantifying the relative sizes, and (2) the wide availability of data over the time period in question for physical military size. While scholars immediately following the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki predicted that the advent of nuclear weapons would eliminate the need for large standing armies, the Cold War seems to present enough evidence to the contrary that those arguments can be disregarded. A large military is still a crucial element of a country’s force projection[15]. Numbers will be based on the Correlates of War 2 dataset[16]. Also from the same dataset we draw measures of iron and steel production (USirst, Coirst, Compirst); primary energy consumption (formerly coal consumption) (USpec, Copec, Comppec); total population (UStpop, Cotpop, Comptpop); urban population (USupop, Coupop, Compupop); and a general measure of readiness for war (UScinc, Cocinc, Compcinc)Distance (Distance)
Certainly proximity is a factor as well. A threat from half a world away can be disregarded simply because the will to fulfill may not be deemed present[17]. Distances are entered in kilometers from capital city to capital city by air. This data will be used even for cases prior to 1930 (prior to the advent of the military’s use of the airplane) for the sake of simplicity and consistency.Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions
The final control variable answers the failing of other research to quantify a target’s resolve in a coercive setting. Art and Cronin note that “[r]esolve is notoriously difficult to estimate before a coercive contest begins…”[18] Resolve, saving “face”, and other sociological indicators are all classified as “notoriously difficult to estimate.” This paper introduces elements that have not been widely applied by scholars of political science. Hofstede’s Dimensions are a psychological and anthropological study to determine if certain personality traits are grounded in the country of origin and culture. Hofstede identified six “anthropological problem areas that different national societies handle differently: ways of coping with inequality, ways of coping with uncertainty, the relationship of the individual with her or his primary group, [etc.]…”[19]
The dimensions have their critics, who point out that the whole is the sum of its parts, but that the parts are very different from the whole[20]. While that may affect the outcome in certain cases, the proof of their application here lies in the scope of time considered—outliers can be identified and tagged for further analysis while the general model remains the same. They are as follows:
Power Distance Index (PDI) (USpdi, Copdi, Comppdi)
“The extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally.”[21]Hofstede uses this measure to address the extent to which people view inequality as normal: whether they are more consultative, egalitarian and democratic (low power distance) or if they acknowledge their superior’s power derived from a hierarchical structure (high power distance). This is measured on a 120 point scale where 0 indicates the lowest power distance and 120 represents the highest.
Individualism (IDV) vs. Collectivism (USidv, Coidv, Compidv)
“The degree to which individuals are integrated into groups”[22]Does the culture stress individual rights or personal achievements and place the immediate family first, or do individuals interact in highly cohesive groups that give them their identity and protection? In the data set generated by Hofstede, Guatemala scores the lowest (highly collectivist) and the United States scores the highest (highly individualistic).
Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) (USuai, Couai, Compuai)
“[A] society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity”[23]With this variable, Hofstede measures how cultures cope with anxiety. It reflects whether they are emotional and attempt to minimize uncertainty by slow, iterative changes (high uncertainty avoidance) or if they are pragmatic and tolerant of change, avoiding restrictions and exist in unstructured, malleable environments (low uncertainty avoidance).
Quantity of Life vs. Quality of Life (MAS) (USmas, Comas, Compmas)
“In...[quantity of life oriented] cultures...there is a feeling that conflicts should be resolved by a good fight...The industrial relations scene in these countries is marked by such fights...In [quality of life oriented] cultures...there is a preference for resolving conflicts by compromise and negotiations.”[24]Cultures that favor quantity of life are competitive, assertive, materialistic, ambitious, and power-hungry while cultures that favor quality of life place more value on relationships. Here Japan scores very high (95 – quantity of life focus) compared to Sweden (5 – quality of life focus).
Long Term Orientation (LTO), vs. Short Term Orientation (USltowvs, Coltowvs, Compltowvs)
This measure identifies a culture’s time horizon: Long-term oriented societies are more pragmatic, focusing on rewards, persistence, saving, and adapting to situations. Short-term oriented societies are more focused on saving face, reciprocation, preserving tradition and fulfilling obligations. Puerto Rico comes in at 0 (short-term oriented) while South Korea comes in at 100 (long-term oriented).Indulgence, vs. Restraint (USivr, Coivr, Compivr)
Indulgent societies allow people to freely satisfy needs. Cultures that favor restraint suppress gratification with social norms. Pakistan is home to a culture shows high levels of restraint, while Venezuela shows high levels of indulgence.Certainly, one will note that there are other “social” variables that are not being considered. They have no place in this paper as they are non-quantifiable and the scope of this paper is to provide easily quantifiable data for a measure of understanding by policymakers. These variables subjectively employed by qualitative theorists (like the perceived value of the demand made by the aggressor state[25]), while potentially valuable, are difficult to quantify and even more difficult to reach agreement on. As the purpose of this study is to provide clear tools for the policymaker, they will be disregarded. Note also that we do not consider instances regionally, as significance given the regional effect has no currently understood meaning and would fail to provide useful information[26].
Other variables which are not included are the style of governance. While most scholars agree that the style of governance of the country being coerced is a hugely significant factor, they do not take into account the informal method of approaching the data, and the relevant significance is lost. Some say that dictatorships are less likely to respond to coercion because attempts at coercion have no effect on them personally, only the people of their country. Others say that dictatorships are less likely to respond in order to show their people that they have a firm grasp on the situation in the face of overwhelming odds. Or that dictators will concede privately but publicly refuse in order to maintain that same illusion of control[27]. The lack of strong quantitative data eliminates this variable as a possibility for inclusion into the model.
Another element I do not include is how recently the aggressor nation has attempted to coerce that nation previously. As with multiple rounds of the game “Chicken,” players learn that their opponent is unlikely to actually commit themselves to action because of the cost involved on their part[28]. As a result of attempts that failed because the coerced country failed to comply without any retaliatory action by the host country, the legitimacy of the coercion attempts are questioned by the challenged state. However, the difficulty of operationalizing “national memory”[29] limits the effectiveness of this variable in a quantitative study of this nature.
[1] Art Mandel, et al.
[2] See Robert Ross. “China and the Cambodian peace process: The value of coercive diplomacy” (1991); Maria Sperandei. “Bridging Deterrence and Compellence: An alternative approach to the study of coercive diplomacy.” International Studies Review 8, pp.253-280 (2006)
[3] Robert Mandell. “The effectiveness of gunboat diplomacy.” International Studies Quarterly 30, pp.59-76 (1986); G. Snyder and P. Diesing. Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises. Princeton. (1977); Blechman and Kaplan.
[4] Robert Mandell (1986) p.59
[5] George Shultz. “Power and Diplomacy in the 1980s.” in Realism, Strength, Negotiation p.8 U.S. Deparment of State, Bureau of Public Affairs
[6] Blechman and Kaplan pp.12-13
[7] Definitions for the following are provided by the Correlates of War 2 Project. Faten Ghosn and Glenn Palmer, Codebook for the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data, Version 3.0; April 14, 2003
[8] This is a commonly accepted and widely used cutoff in differentiating between “military action” and all-out “war.”
[9] Ghosn and Palmer
[10] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. "Game Theory, Political Economy, and the Evolving Study of War and Peace" American Political Science Review 100:4 (2006)
[11] Susan Allen. “Time Bombs: Estimating the Duration of Coercive Bombing Campaigns” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 51:1 (2007); Robert Art. “Coercive Diplomacy: What do we know?” The United States and Coercive Diplomacy edt. Patrick Cronin. US Institute of Peace Press (2003); Barry Blechman and Tamara Wittes. “Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Policy” Political Science Quarterly, 114:1 (1999);Roy Licklider. “Coercive Diplomacy Revisited” Mershon International Studies Review 38:2 (1994); Fiona McGillivray and Allan Stam. “Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48:2 (2004)
[12] See Coral Bell. The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management London: Oxford Univ. Press (1971)
[13] Based on the Correlates of War 2 Project. Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer, “Militarized Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale Coding Rules and Empirical Patterns” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 15 (1996)
[14] From a speech at the Washington Institute “Nuclear Compellance and Deterrance”
[15] From a speech given at the Kennedy Center “Force Projection or Force Protection” by Producer Dodge Billingsley (2007)
[16] See Jones, Bremer and Singer for an explanation of the data collection process.
[17] Jennifer Mitzen. “Reading Habermas in Anarchy: Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Public Spheres.” The American Political Science Review 99:3 (2005)
[18] Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, eds. The United States and Coercive Diplomacy Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press (2003)
[19] Geert Hofstede. Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations Second Edition, Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publications, 2001
[20] B. Gerhart and M. Fang “National Culture and Human Resource Management: Assumptions and Evidence” International Journal of Human Resource Management, 16.6, 971–986 (2005), et al.
[21] Ibid
[22] Ibid
[23] Ibid
[24] Ibid p. 143
[25] And other variables as explored by Robert Art in his paper “Coercive Diplomacy: What do we know?” in The United States and Coercive Diplomacy edt. Patrick Cronin. US Institute of Peace Press, (2003)
[26] James Tedeschi, Thomas Bonoma and Robert Brown. “A Paradigm for the Study of Coercive Power.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 15:2 (1971)
[27] Robert Art. “Coercive Diplomacy: What do we know?” The United States and Coercive Diplomacy edt. Patrick Cronin. US Institute of Peace Press, (2003)
[28] H. Kahn. “On escalation: metaphors and scenarios” Praeger Publications, New York (1965)
[29] Hermann Bausinger and Konrad Kostlin (eds.) “Heimat und Identitat” Volkskunde-Kongress (1979) Translation provided by Wade Jacoby (2006)
[30] Barry Blechman and Tamara Wittes. “Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Policy.” Political Science Quarterly, 114:1 (1999); Barry Blechman and S. Kaplan. Force without War: US Armed Forces as a Political Instrument Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution. (1978); Robert Art. “Coercive Diplomacy: What do we know?” The United States and Coercive Diplomacy edt. Patrick Cronin. US Institute of Peace Press, (2003); Phillip Gallo, Jr. “Effects of Increased Incentives upon the use of threat in Bargaining.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 4:1 (1966)