The policy implications for this research are enormous. Contrast the statement by President Bush at the beginning of this paper in which he said that we cannot tell “where and when force can be effective, where no other policies are likely to be effective…” He claimed that “[t]here can be no single or simple set of fixed rules for using force...Each and every case is unique.” However, with Coral Bell’s “careful calculation,” not of the adversary’s power—we have determined—but the United States’ power and the dimensions of the adversary’s culture we can apply a single, simple set of fixed rules. Assuming that there is no way to predict all the variables that go into coercive diplomacy mirrors the attitude of the scholars of their time—their analysis is perfect in retrospect and uncertain in the present. This model shows incredibly stable predictive power over time.
The results are also unambiguous, with more than 85% of countries exhibiting either 98-100% or 0-2% likelihood of failure. The results of the model do not preclude actions against countries where coercive diplomacy is unlikely to have success, they merely indicate to the policy-maker that another means of persuasion to achieve policy aims would be better suited for the country in question.
Additionally, the significance of the cultural dimensions play a role in making the applications of the paper timeless. Geerge Hofstede has measured the dimensions since 1971 and notes that “These relative scores have been proven to be quite stable over decades. The forces that cause cultures to shift tend to be global or continent-wide. This means that they affect many countries at the same time, so that if their cultures shift, they shift together, and their relative positions remain the same.”[1] Three dimensions account for the most sensitive part of the model, with fluctuations as small as 10 points in COidv, COmas, and COivr leading to vastly different outcomes.
The constancy of the dimensions means that they will be usable over
time, unlike other variables that must be measured annually or supplemented
with a forecasted value in order for the model to maintain its accuracy. The
applicability of these variables, too, is not limited to states as a whole.
Hofstede has measured the dimensions for well-defined subsets of populations in
limited cases, and this practice could certainly be expanded.
The ambiguity of the role of nuclear weapons plays no real part in
policy prescriptions. Their role is already widely debated by force
projectionists. Nor is it the conclusion of this paper that the United States
should decrease its military spending or scale down its readiness for war. The
recommendations of this paper apply only as it pertains to increasing the
effectiveness of coercive diplomacy. Policy makers must, as always, weight
their options when making decisions of this nature. This research serves to give
them a better scale with which to do so.
[1]
Geert Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors,
Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations Second Edition, Thousand Oaks CA: Sage
Publications, 2001